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1962] COMMENTS 631 
TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SECTION 2036-Among the more serious problems facing the estate 
planner is the question of how the various inter vivos transfers of 
property which a client may make while retaining some form of 
interest himself will be treated for federal estate tax purposes. The 
heart of this problem is section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 which is designed to reach, generally, those interests in 
property retained by a decedent for the balance of his life.1 The 
section provides: 
"(a) General Rule-The value of the gross estate shall in-
clude the value of all property ... to the extent of any interest 
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a 
transfer . . . , by trust or otherwise, under which he has 
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable with-
out reference to his death or for any period which does not in 
fact end before his death-
(1) the' possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the 
income from, the property, or 
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any 
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy 
the property or the income therefrom."2 
Like other sections of the Code which define includibility, section 
2036 is directed at traditional concepts of property interests. Thus, 
property transferred in fee by the decedent with the reservation of 
a life estate for himself is clearly to be included in his gross estate 
under section 2036; the value of an inter vivos trust from which 
the settlor reserves income for life is similarly includible.3 While 
1 The types of property interests which are includible in the decedent's gross estate 
are defined by !NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 2033-42. Section 2033 is the general provision 
which includes all property of the decedent to the extent of his interest at death. The 
other provisions make includible certain specific properties: § 2034--dower and curtesy 
interests, § 2035-transactions in contemplation of death, § 2036-life estates, § 2037-
transfers taking effect at death where decedent has a 5% reversionary interest, § 2038-
revocable transfers, § 2039-annuities, § 2040-joint interests, § 2041-powers of 
appointment, and § 2042-life insurance policies. 
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036. 
a Treas. Reg. § 20.2036·1 (1958). 
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section 2036 can be applied without question to these historical 
property interests, it is not so clear that it can or should be applied 
to such diverse property relationships as crossed trusts, survivor-
ship annuities, trusts to satisfy legal obligations, powers to allocate 
trust funds between principal and income beneficiaries, or com-
bined annuity-life insurance policies. If these property arrange-
ments are to be included in the gross estate of a decedent, they 
must be analogized to the traditional life estate. A failure so to 
analogize them must have the effect of freeing these interests from 
federal estate tax because section 2036 contains the only general 
description which could encompass such arrangements.4 
Recent decisions demonstrate that the courts have not been 
able to agree upon the intended scope of this key section. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith5 is an excellent illustration of 
this problem. In this case the decedent purchased three life 
insurance policies although she had reached an age at which she 
had become uninsurable. The policies were issued without a 
medical examination upon condition that decedent purchase in 
addition three annuities for her life.6 At all times the insurer 
treated the arrangements as separate contracts. Decedent trans-
ferred the policies irrevocably to the beneficiarie~ and paid the 
gift tax. The Third Circuit reasoned that such an arrangement 
was equivalent to the decedent's setting up a trust for herself for 
life, remainder over,7 and held the value of the insurance policies 
includible in decedent's gross estate under section 2036. 
However, the Supreme Court reversed on appeal and held that 
the arrangement involved two distinct transactions. Since neither 
of the transactions individually constituted an arrangement subject 
4 Section 2036 is the only provision in the Code which deals with the includibility 
of property interests measured by the life of the transferor. Thus if property interests 
which exist for the life of the decedent-transferor are not reached under § 2036, these 
interests will not be included in his gross estate. See note l supra. 
5 356 U.S. 274 (1958), 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1366. 
6 The Court found that because the total amount of the premiums for both the 
annuities and the life policies was great enough to generate more than the required 
interest to make the annuity payments and was great enough to pay the face value of 
the life insurance policies, the company incurred no monetary risk by writing the 
policies. However, if the beneficiaries had surrendered their policies for their cash 
surrender value, it is doubtful that the fund remaining would have been sufficient to 
pay the annuity over a substantial period of time. See Note, 42 CoLUM. L. REv. 162 
(1942). 
7 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1957). 
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to estate tax liability,8 the decedent had not created relationships 
which would subject her estate to the payment of the tax. 
The Fidelity-Philadelphia decision decided the narrow prob-
lem of the application of section 2036 to the single-premium 
combined annuity-life insurance policy situation.9 But the decision 
was greeted by many as one based on the form of the relationship 
rather than the substance of the property interests which in fact 
existed.1O Because of the criticism of this decision as a deviation 
from the purpose for which section 2036 had been adopted, it 
seems appropriate to look at the intent which Congress manifested 
when the forerunners of section 2036 were enacted. 
This comment will explore two problems: first, an analysis of 
the legislative history of the present section 2036 in an effort to 
discover exactly which property relationships Congress intended 
to reach by this provision; second, an examination of the treatment 
which several specific arrangements have been given by the courts 
to determine whether there is any degree of certainty or predict-
ability in the application of section 2036. 
J. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 2036 
The first federal estate tax was passed as part of the Revenue 
Act of 1916.11 The tax was imposed on the net estate of every 
8 The annuity was not taxable since the decedent had no interest in the property at 
the time of his death. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(a). The value of the insurance 
policy is excluded because decedent retained no incidents of its ownership. INT. R.Ev. 
CoDE OF 1954, § 2042(2). 
9 Before the decision of the Fidelity-Philadelphia case, the federal circuits had been 
divided on whether to apply § 2036 to the single premium combination annuity-life 
insurance policy circumstance. The Sixth, Second and Ninth Circuits had held the 
property interest taxable on the theory decedent had carried out a single transaction, 
which was in substance equivalent to a life trust. Conway v. Glenn, 193 F.2d 965 (6th 
Cir. 1952); Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. Clise, 
122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821 (1942). The Seventh Circuit in 
Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952), held such an arrangement was not 
taxable since it involved two transactions. The Bohnen case was affirmed by an equally 
divided court, 345 U.S. 946 (1953). To decide the Fidelity-Philadelphia case it was also 
necessary for the Court to distinguish Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941). That 
case was factually similar to the Fidelity-Philadelphia case except the decedent had 
retained the incidents of ownership of the insurance policy. However, the grounds for 
that decision were not that the arrangement was taxable as insurance, but that it did not 
constitute an insurance risk and was therefore taxable only under § 2036. 312 U.S. at 
540. 
10 See, e.g., 72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 109 (1958); 1958 u. ILL. L.F. 480; 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1366 
(1958); 43 MINN. L. R.Ev. 354 (1958). See generally Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity 
Contracts Under Estate and Inheritance Taxes, 39 MICH. L. R.Ev. 856 (1941). 
11 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 1-901, 39 Stat. 756. 
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decedent.12 The value of a decedent's gross estate was to include, 
according to section 202 (b) , "a transfer ... intended to take effect 
in possession or enjoyment at or after his death."13 The committee 
reports in neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate 
indicate any elaboration of the terms used in the statute itself. The 
sole concern of the Congress seemed to be with the need to increase 
revenues in the face of world events in 1916.14 The imposition of 
an estate tax was looked upon as one solution to this problem. A 
few decisions were handed down interpreting the meaning of 
section 202 (b) , but these did little to modify what seemed to be 
the plain meaning of the statute. In Shukert v. Allen15 the 
decedent with a life expectancy of sixteen years set up a trust, in 
which he retained no beneficial interest, to accumulate income for 
thirty years. The Court held that the managerial interest-as 
opposed to beneficial interest-did not make the trust includible 
in decedent's gross estate. In Nichols v. Coolidge16 the decedent 
had created a trust for herself for life, with the corpus over after 
her death. In 1917 she had assigned her life interest to the holder 
of the remainder. The Court held that the decedent's interest in 
the trust was not includible in her gross estate. The conclusion, 
however, was reached solely on the ground that the trust was 
created before the enactment of the statute. Two trusts were 
involved in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.17 The first trust to A 
and then on the death of the decedent-settlor to B was held non-
taxable, while a second trust to the decedent for life with a power 
of revocation, remainder over to B, was held to be includible in the 
gross estate of the decedent. None of these cases attempted to 
define broadly the scope of section 202 (b) ; but it was generally 
assumed that the simple case of a trust with income to decedent 
for life and remainder over would be includible in the gross estate 
for federal estate tax purposes. 
In 1930, however, the Supreme Court handed down its famous 
decision of May v. Heiner.18 In that case, the decedent had created 
12 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 201, 39 Stat. 777. 
13 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777. 
14 H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1916). · 
15 273 U.S. 545 (1927). See generally LOWNDES 8: KRAMER, THE EsTATE AND GIFr TAX 
ch. 8 (1956). 
16 274 U.S. 531 (1927). 
17 278 U.S. 339 (1929). 
1s 281 U.S. 238 (1930). 
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a trust for herself for life, then to her husband for his life, the 
corpus over on the death of both. The Court reasoned that the 
transfer took place not at death but at the time of the execution 
of the trust agreement. The thought that May v. Heiner could 
be distinguished because of the intervening life estate was dispelled 
a year later when the Court handed down three per curiam 
opinions holding that a trust for the decedent-settlor for life, 
corpus over, was not includible in the decedent's gross estate.19 
The day following these per curiam decisions, Congress passed 
the Joint Resolution of March 3, 193!2° (the forerunner of section 
2036) aimed at correcting the problem of the Heiner case. 
Discussion on the floor of Congress indicated that Congress had 
thought since the passage of the 1916 act that the life trust had 
been taxable under the provisions of that act.21 It is also apparent 
from the reports that the urgency of the action of Congress was 
caused solely by the possible loss of revenue to the government if 
life trusts continued to be outside the reach of the federal estate 
tax.22 The discussion of this resolution contains nothing which 
would indicate that Congress intended to do more than simply 
make includible in the decedent's gross estate a trust giving the 
decedent the income for his life. Section 803 of the Revenue Act 
of 193223 took the changes of the joint resolution and attempted to 
19 Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); Mersman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 
783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931). 
20 " ••• a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life or any period 
not ending before his death (I) the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the 
property or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property 
or the income therefrom." Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1516. 
21 Mr. Smoot: "It had generally been considered that this provision of the statute 
covered cases such as those referred to above. The Treasury Department had so contrued 
the statute since the first Federal estate tax law in 1916 and its regulations so provide. 
If, for example, the owner of property transferred the title to his house to a trustee 
for the benefit of his children after his death, but in the meantime reserved the use, 
income and enjoyment of the house to himself during his own lifetime, it was supposed 
that the value of the property at the date of his death should be included in his estate 
for purposes of the estate tax. Under the decisions rendered yesterday, the property 
would not be included in computing the Federal estate tax. 
"It is entirely apparent that if this situation is permitted to continue, the Federal 
estate tax will be seriously affected .••• It is of the greatest importance, therefore, that 
this situation be corrected and that this obvious opportunity for tax avoidance be 
removed. It is for that purpose that the joint resolution is proposed." 74 CONG. REc. 
7078 (1931). 
22 74 CoNG. REc. 7198 (letter of Ogden L. Mills, Acting Secretary of the Treasury 
and discussion thereof). 
23 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803, 47 Stat. 279. 
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clarify them and put them in context in the law.24 In addition the 
1932 act added the words "or for any period not ascertainable 
without reference to his death" to make includible a trust where 
income was payable to the decedent only to the last payment period 
before his death. Prior to 1932, since any income accrued during 
the last interest period was not to be paid to him or to his estate, 
he had been held not to have retained a trust for his life.25 Also 
added by the 1932 act was a provision dealing with concurrence in 
the right to designate income beneficiaries.26 The committee re-
ports also indicate that two clarifying changes were made by the 
1932 act,27 but the act in general was not designed to broaden the 
scope of the joint resolution. There is nothing in the committee 
reports which would support an inference that Congress was 
concerned with a broader application of the statute than to 
encompass life trusts. No significant changes have been made in 
the substance of section 2036 since the Act of 1932. 
It must be noted that it is possible to interpret the language of 
section 2036 broadly enough to encompass many other types of 
property arrangements, especially when the courts are willing to 
consider the substance rather than the form of the interests created. 
The fact remains that in the light of the history of the section an 
intent of Congress to go farther than merely to include a simple 
trust arrangement in the decedent's gross cannot be established. 
The large number of other types of property arrangements which 
have been found to be within the scope of section 2036 have been 
put there by the process of judicial interpretation. Even if the 
legitimacy of an expanded construction of the statute is granted, 
the courts, nevertheless, have been inconsistent in its application. 
II. THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 2036 
The application of section 2036 to varying fact situations 
provides no degree of certainty or predictability. The courts seem 
rather to have adopted an ad hoc approach in their interpretation 
of the statute. In construing section 2036 the courts have been 
forced to consider, under a provision intended to encompass only 
24 H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1932). 
25 H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1932). 
26 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 279; H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 
1st Sess. 47 (1932). 
27 H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1932). 
1962] COMMENTS 637 
life estates in the historic sense of that word, property interests 
which could not have been held taxable under any other section. 
If an expanded construction is to be given section 2036, it should 
be applied consistently to basically similar property interests, 
which should be included in the decedent's gross estate only if 
they closely parallel the historic life estate. 
In the Fidelity-Philadelphia case, discussed at the outset,28 the 
Court did not take account of the substance of the interests created 
and held that section 2036 was inapplicable. Contrast this with 
the treatment given section 2036 in State Street Trust Co. v. 
United States.29 There the decedent created a trust with himself 
as trustee, retaining only broad investment powers. He retained 
no income for himself and no specific power to appoint the income. 
The First Circuit, however, reasoned that because his power over 
investments was broad enough to make allocations between prin-
cipal and income, he had retained the power to determine the 
beneficial enjoyment of the income from the trust. As a result of 
the property interests created, the decedent in Fidelity-Philadel-
phia received beneficial enjoyment of a life income, while the 
trustee in State Street Trust had no beneficial enjoyment. Yet 
no tax was suffered by the estate in Fidelity-Philadelphia, while in 
the State Street case the trust was included in the decedent's gross 
estate. If we are to distinguish between the two cases, it would 
seem more logical to tax the property transfer which gave the 
decedent a beneficial interest. 
The application of section 2036 in the area of crossed trusts is 
illustrative of the same basic confusion. In Lehman v. Com-
missioner,30 two brothers created trusts for one another. The trust 
which named the first brother to die as its income beneficiary was 
held includible in his gross estate even though it had been created 
(transferred) by the surviving brother. The Court found that one 
trust served as the quid pro quo for the other and so the interest 
created was the same as if decedent had created the trust for 
himself. In McLain v. ]arecki31 decedent set up a trust to accumu-
late income until his death; then this income was to be paid to his 
28 See text at p. 6!12 supra. 
29 26!! F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1959), 45 CORNELL L.Q. 598 (1960). See Gray and Covey, 
State Street-A Case Study of Sections 20!J6(a)(2) and 2038, 15 TAX L. REv. 75 (1959). 
80 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940). 
81 2!12 F.2d 2ll (7th Cir. 1956). 
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wife for life, remainder over to his daughter. His wife set up a 
similar trust with an accumulation of income until her death, and 
she named decedent income beneficiary for his life. Despite the 
fact that the instruments were drawn at the same time by the same 
lawyer, the Court concluded that one trust was not the consider-
ation for the other and held the trust in question was not includible 
in the decedent's gross estate. Some courts have adopted the 
reasoning of the McLain case and have concluded that a mere 
"unity of action" in the establishment of trusts is not proof of 
consideration, and trusts thus created are not subject to federal 
estate tax.32 At least one court, however, has held that considera-
tion can be presumed from the creation of crossed trusts.33 Crossed 
trusts, because of the beneficial enjoyment of the decedent, would 
seem to be logically includible under section 2036. 
Section 2036 faces uncertain application as well in the area of 
discretionary trusts. In Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co.34 the 
decedent set up a trust to pay his ex-wife a monthly income of $150. 
The balance of income was to be paid to the decedent. The trustee 
had the power to refund to the settlor the corpus of the trust so 
long as enough remained to pay the ex-wife her monthly income. 
Decedent received enough back from the trustee at his request to 
establish a similar trust for his second wife. He received no pay-
ments from the second trust as he did from the first. It was held 
here that the trusts were not includible in his gross estate.35 It 
would seem that the estate tax could be avoided completely simply 
by picking a trustee who in fact could be trusted and letting him 
pay over income at his discretion. Is there really a significant 
difference if the trustee is a personal friend, an attorney or the 
decedent himself? The reason behind the establishment of a 
discretionary trust, which could pay income to the settlor, would 
seem to be one of tax avoidance, and under section 2036 it would 
seem logical to include this type of trust in the decedent's gross 
estate, unless in fact the decedent received no beneficial enjoyment 
of the income. 
32 Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953); In Te Lueders' 
Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947). 
33 Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944). 
34 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945). 
35 Contm, Selznick's Estate v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 716, afj'd, 195 F.2d 735 (9th 
Cir. 1952). 
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In Delaney v. Gardner36 the decedent made an inter vivos 
transfer of stocks to a family corporation set up to take care of a 
family homestead. It was a non-stock corporation, but decedent 
was one of a seven-member board who exercised control of the 
corporation. While the court found that the decedent did not in 
fact exercise dominion over the other members of the board, it 
is apparent from the opinion that the decedent's wealth was a large 
part of the corporate assets, and it would have been possible to 
reconvey the beneficial interest to the decedent by action of the 
board (although the transfer was in form irrevocable). Again, 
the result seems to be justified by the wording of the statute, but 
it might be asked if even the First Circuit is consistent in its 
application of section 2036, when one compares Delaney v. 
Gardner37 with State Street Trust Co. v. United States.38 However, 
in reviewing all the cases, the result reached in the Delaney case 
seems justified since the decedent received no beneficial enjoyment 
of the transferred property.39 
While the provisions of section 2036 have been leniently 
applied in some areas, they have been held to include in the gross 
estate most forms of survivorship annuities.40 An annuity pur-
chased from community property providing for payments to the 
husband for his life and then to the wife for her life was held 
taxable to the husband's estate.41 The court apparently reasoned 
that since the wife had.a much longer life expectancy, such an 
annuity transaction was merely a device to avoid the estate tax. A 
survivorship annuity bought by two sisters, each paying one half of 
the cost is taxable to the estate of the first to die.42 The principal 
exception to the includibility of survivorship annuities seems to 
have been in the area of pension benefits. In the normal case the 
employer sets up an annuity for the employee to begin upon his 
retirement. Under most such plans, however, the employee has 
the option of electing a smaller annuity payment for himself and 
the payment of an annuity after his death to a third person, usually 
36 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953). 
37 Ibid. 
ss 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). 
30 Cf. Estate of Klauber, 34 T.C. 968 (1960). 
40 E.g., Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821 
(1942). 
41 Commissioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1941). 
42 Pruyn's Estate v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1950). 
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his wife, for life. The courts, apparently reasoning that this does 
not constitute a "transfer" but rather a relinquishment of part of 
a larger right, have held this type of transaction not includible in 
the employee's gross estate.43 The same result has been reached in 
a case where the employer and the employee both made contri-
butions to the pension fund.44 
The above-described pension plans take property belonging 
to the decedent and divide it into present and future interests. 
The present interest is retained by the decedent and the future 
interest is "transferred" to another person. This arrangement 
gives the decedent a beneficial interest in the property which 
should be reached if section 2036 is to be consistently applied. 
Becklenberg's Estate v. Commissioner45 illustrates the confusion 
further. There decedent set up an irrevocable trust out of which 
the trustee was to purchase annuities for the decedent, but in the 
absence of such annuities, decedent was to be allowed up to 
$10,000 per year from the trust. Decedent was paid income and 
no annuities were in fact ever purchased. Held, since decedent 
could have been paid from principal, this did not constitute a 
retention of income. In other cases, the Seventh Circuit has held 
that a trust to pay $100 income, with discretion to pay more is 
includible in gross income,46 and a survivorship annuity to de-
cedent for life and then to his daughter for her life is also in-
cludible.47 It has been argued that these decisions cannot be 
reconciled using any "rational basis of estate taxation."48 
Finally section 2036 has been applied to trusts created to satisfy 
a legal obligation of the decedent. For example, decedent in the 
typical case will establish a trust to pay his wife's support for her 
life, remainder over. Since decedent already had the obligation 
to support his wife, and if the funds did not come from this trust 
he would have to provide them from his other income, the courts 
have treated this trust in the same way in which a trust payable 
to the decedent for life would be treated.49 So long as the trust is 
48 Higg's Estate v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950). 
44 Commissioner v. Twogood's Estate, 194 F .2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952). 
45 273 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1959). 
46 In re Uhl's Estate, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957). 
47 Forster v. Sauber, 249 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1957). 
48 Covey, Section 2036-The New Problem Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAX 
COUNSELOR'S Q. 121 (1960). 
49 Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Co., 111 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 
1940). 
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declared to be for the "support and maintenance" of the wife, it 
has been held taxable even though in reality the use of the trust 
money was for a purpose upon which the decedent was not legally 
obligated.110 Trusts used to satisfy obligations arising out of sepa-
ration agreements present the greatest problems in the application 
of section 2036. Where the wife gives up her marital rights, there 
is no consideration for the trust, 61 and it has been held includible 
in the decedent's gross estate.112 However, the wife's promise to 
support the children has been treated as an adequate consideration 
for the trust.113 When a trust satisfies a legal obligation of the 
decedent, it frees other funds for his beneficial enjoyment and 
thus is equivalent to a reservation of a beneficial enjoyment in 
transferred property. 
It is apparent from the previous discussion that section 2036 
has been applied to property relationships beyond the reservation 
of the life trust. Even though this is not in accord with the 
apparent intent of Congress, it perhaps could be justified if the 
section were applied equally to all property relationships which are 
analogous in substance to the life trust. The obvious fact is that 
there is little if any consistency in the section's application. In 
Greene v. United States,114 decedent transferred property to his 
daughters, and they agreed to pay him the income for life. The 
court held that the interest here created was taxable since it was 
analogous to a trust giving decedent the income for life. Compare 
this to the treatment of the combination annuity-life insurance 
policy which was held not includible in decedent's gross estate,115 
and then try to put into section 2036 logically the includibility of a 
trust in which decedent merely retained broad management 
powers.116 None of these three cases presents a property interest 
which is exactly the life estate intended to be included under 
section 2036. But if we are to distinguish between the cases, it 
would be logical not to include the last situation in the decedent's 
gross estate because it confers no beneficial interest on him. 
liO Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1953). 
111 Commissioner v. Douglass' Estate, 143 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1944); 74 HAR.v. L. REv. 1191 
(1961). 
112 Chase National Bank v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955). 
53 Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940). Contra, National 
Bank of Commerce v. Henslee, 179 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). See generally, 
STEPHENS 8c MARR, FEDERAL EsrATE AND GIFr TAXES 75 (1959). 
6i 237 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1956). 
!SIS Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958). 
56 State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). 
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If a judicial gloss must be put on the statute in spite of the 
apparent intent of Congress, at least the courts should apply this 
gloss evenly. Until there is some greater degree of consistency in 
the application of section 2036, intelligent planning and prediction 
become impossible. Because the courts have been unable to give 
a consistent application to this statute which has been law since 
1932, Congress should take affirmative action and make it clear 
to the courts exactly what kinds of property interests are to be 
taxed under section 2036. 
Even in the absence of congressional action a more definite line 
can be drawn between the cases than the ad hoc approach used at 
present has developed. If the courts insist upon including within 
section 2036 property interests other than the historic life estate 
and the life trust, the following test would at least provide a greater 
degree of consistency: the property should be included in the 
gross estate if the decedent actually enjoys a beneficial interest 
therein. In the discussion above of the various property interests 
to which section 2036 has been applied, an attempt has been made 
to look at each in the light of this test. The test should be a 
factual one. If in fact the decedent had actually received beneficial 
enjoyment for the period of his life from the property transferred, 
such property should be included in his gross estate under section 
2036. 
The use of this test would separate those cases in which the 
decedent retained only managerial benefits from those cases where 
he retained actual beneficial enjoyment. Retention of strictly 
managerial powers would cause the estate no tax liability, while 
the retention of a beneficial interest would cause the tax to be 
imposed in every case. Such a test would also be in tune with the 
intent of Congress in that it would be taxing beneficial interests 
similar in substance, albeit not in form, to the historic life estate. 
Until the time that Congress sees fit to give the courts a guide for 
their use in the application of section 2036, the beneficial interest 
test would give certainty to estate planners in relying upon the 
interpretation the courts would give section 2036. This is a 
desirable result not only in insuring a decedent the disposition he 
wishes to make of his assets, but also in eliminating a good deal of 
expensive litigation which results when a court is called on to make 
its independent analysis of a particular property arrangement. 
William S. Bach, S.Ed. 
